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Center for Professional Ethics

Volume 3, Number 3

A Publication from the Center for Professional Ethics at Case Western Reserve University

The Costs of Tragedy: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Theories of Justice

Ethicist Martha Nussbaum Speaks at CWRU
t is not uncommon for many of those who are
involved with ethics in some way to proclaim
that Martha Nussbaum has changed the way
that many people think about the subject. Lucky
for those people at CWRU, she was the final
speaker at the 2000 Baker-Nord Center for the
Humanities traditional “Humanities Week, ” on
September 20.

I

The Baker Nord-Center facilitates and encourages
collaborative work among faculty and students in
the humanities and performing arts (Art History,
Classics, English, History, Modem Languages,
Music, Philosophy, Religion, Theater and Dance)
with colleagues in the sciences and social sciences,
and through joint programs with other University
Circle institutions. It sponsors conferences, semi
nars, lectures, research and special events that
enhance the presence and visibility of the humani
ties at CWRU. The Baker-Nord Center for the
Humanities was funded in 1996 by an endowment
gift from Eric and Jane Nord. It is directed by Dr.
Tom Bishop, Associate Professor of English. Dr.
Catherine Scallen, Associate Professor of Art
History, serves as Associate Director.

Director^orner:
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Ms. Nussbaum’s speech, “The Costs of Tragedy:
Cost-Benefit Analysis and Theories ofJustice” was
presented in the 1912 Room in Thwing Center on
CWRU’s campus.
“It’s a pleasure to be here, especially during Hu
manities Week,” she said. “Recently, I have been
trying to explain to law, public policy and develop
ment people why the humanities are important to
what they do,” Nussbaum began. Her talk grew

out of a project she had been doing about cost
benefit analysis. “Cost-benefit analysis is a
technique that effects all of our lives, all of the
time. It is important to see what might be the
short comings of cost-benefit analysis, and how
we can see those short comings by thinking
about stories from ancient tragedies.”
As her first example, she used the ancient epic
poem from India titled The Mahabharata.
“Arjuna stands at the head of his troops. A huge
battle is about to begin. On his side are the
Pandavas, the royal family headed by Arjuna’s
eldest brother and legitimate heir to the throne.
On the other side are his cousins, who have
usurped power,” she explained. “More or less
everyone has joined one side or the other. Arjuna
sees that many on the enemy’s side are blameless
people for whom he has great affection. In the
ensuing battle, he will have to kill as many of
them as possible. How can it be right to embark
on a course that will bring death to so many
relations and friends? How, on the other hand,
could it possibly be right to abandon one’s own
side and one’s family in doing thatf”
Here, she quoted the poem directly:
“Arjuna saw his closest kinsman related to him
as father or grandfather, uncle or brother, son or
grandson, as well as companion and friend, on
both sides. Overcome by this sight he said in
sorrow and compassion. ‘Oh Krishna, when I
see my own people ready to fight and eager for
battle my limbs shudder and my mouth is dry my
body shivers, my hair stands on end. Eurther-
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more, I see evil portents, and I can see no good in
killing my own kinsman. It is not right and proper
that we not kill our own kin and kinsman. How can
we be happy if we slay our own people? Oh Krishna,
how can I strike with my arrows people who are
worthy of my respect?’ Having said these words
Arjuna threw away his bow and arrows and sat down
sorrowfully...”
Inherent in Arjuna’s distress are two questions. “The
first question I am calling the obvious question and it
is, ‘What he ought to do?’ That question may be very
difficult to answer and, as well, it may be difficult to
identify the best method of arriving at the answer,”
she explained. “What is not difficult, however, is to
see it is a question that has to be answered since some
action must be taken. In such a situation, even
inaction is a kind of action. In that sense, the ques
tion is obvious — it is just forced by the situation.
Arjuna cannot be both a loyal, dutiful leader of his
family and, at the same time, a preserver of lives of
his friends and relations on the other side. He has to
choose.”
According to Professor Nussbaum, the second
question is not obvious and is not forced by the
situation. Most importantly, it is a question that might
have easily eluded Arjuna. “I shall call this question:
‘the tragic question,’ ” she said.
The tragic question rears its head when there is a
chance none of the alternatives available to someone
are morally acceptable. “Arjuna feels that this ques
tion must be faced and when it is faced, its answer is
‘no,’ ” she explained. “Krishna, by contrast, either
fails to see the force of that question all together or
recommends a policy of deliberately not facing it in
order to better get on with his duty. The tragic
question is not simply a way of expressing the fact
that is very difficult to answer the obvious question
— difficulty of choice is quite independent of the
presence of serious moral wrong on both sides of the
choice. In fact, in this case, as in many tragic dilem
mas, it’s rather dear what Arjuna ought to do, much
though he’s tempted to throw away his arrows (that
would, of course, ultimately accomplish nothing —
resulting simply in the deaths of many more on his
own side and possibly the loss of their ‘just cause’
while countless lives will stiU be lost on the other
side).” It is obvious that Arjuna must fight.

“In non-tragic cases, the obvious question may
frequently be very difficult when two or more nontragic alternatives are equally balanced. The tragic
question registers, not for difficulty of solving the
obvious question, but for distinct difficulty — the
fact that all available answers to the obvious question
including the best one are bad,” she said. Bad, in this
case, as in many others, is defined as “involving
serious moral wrong doing.”
So how does Arjuna determine that the answer to the
tragic question is “no?”
“Arjuna appears to consult an independent account of
ethical value according to which murdering one’s own
family members, especially when they have done no
wrong, is a heinous, moral violation,” explained
Professor Nussbaum. These values include a huge
list of items including: respect, kinship and the right.
“But deserting one’s family when one is their leader
and essential supporter is also morally wrong. Ethical
thoughts independent of the ‘what to do?’ question
enter in to inform him that his predicament is not just
tough, but also tragic,” she said.
With that. Professor Nussbaum got to the heart of
her talk, explaining that she would be aiguing how
important the tragic question is for everyone, espe
cially when we evaluate our choices, but most impor
tantly in situations of public choice. “I will argue
that while cost-benefit analysis offers an attractive way
of approaching the obvious question, it offers no
good way at all of registering the force of the tragic
question or even of representing the situation in
which the answer to that question is no,” she said.
“Too much reliance on cost benefit analysis as a
general method of public choice can distract us from
an issue of major importance.” She reminded us that
many are skilled at making us believe that we have
only one question when, in fact, we have two.
“When we think of our two situations of choice that
I have just described, it might seem that the real
question is the obvious question and the tragic
question is just a useless distraction,” she continued.
Apparently Krishna thinks similarly as seen in the
next quotation of theMahabharata:
“ ‘Oh, Arjuna,’ says Krishna, ‘why have you become
depressed this critical hour? Such dejection is
unknown to noble men It does not lead to the

heavenly heights and on earth it can only cause
disgrace....’ ”

the very special and limited circumstances, like the
ones he faces right here.”

Undoubtedly, there are many people who think that
Krishna is right. “When one sees where one’s duty
lies, one should simply get on with it without tragic
hand-wringing and moaning. We don’t want military
leaders who self indulgently wring their hands about
the blood they are about to shed, or who throw away
their arrows and sit sorrowfully. It does no good for
them to think this way and it may well do harm to
their troops,” she said. “On the other hand, I think it
is possible to argue that Arjuna, who sees the tragic
question, is a better model of deliberation here than
Krishna, who does not.” An important point to
Arjuna’s tragic question is that the tragedy could have
been avoided by better political planning. According
to Nussbaum, this keeps the mind of the chooser (in
this case, Arjuna) firmly on the fact that his action is
an immoral action that it is always wrong to choose,
albeit under duress.

It is vital that people are reminded of the tragic
question during war for it can reinforce morality that
should be reinforced in this difficult time. Terrible
things occur when the tragic question is not ad
dressed. For example, in war, people could take the
infliction of damage on civilians too lightly. “When I
talked about this topic a few years back at West Point,
the officers and the cadets were very keen on the idea
of keeping this particular question in mind as they
were worried about the atrocities committed during
the Vietnam War,” she said.

“The recognition that one is going to have dirty hands
is not just self-indulgence,” she said. “It has great
significance for future actions. It informs the
chooser, for example, that he is going to owe repara
tions to the vanquished and an effort to rebuild their
lives after the disaster has been inflicted upon them,”
she said. “Most significantly, it reminds the chooser
that he must not do such things henceforth except in

According to Professor Nussbaum, many moral
philosophers have insisted that tragic conflicts are
conflicts only of what they callprimafacie obligations.
“That is to say, obligations that are preliminary, but
not final and there can be only one right choice, and
once the choice is arrived at, the conflicting obligation
simply drops away,” she explained. “I think the
difficulty with this idea is that it makes morality the
handmaiden of fortune. The sheer fact that obliga
tion ‘a’ conflicts with obligation ‘b’ brings about that
‘a’ or ‘b’ is no longer binding. This allows people to
wiggle out of commitments that should be regarded
as binding.” For example, someone like Arjuna, who
knows killing his kin wrong should not change his
mind because of a certain event. “Such a picture of
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The tragic question is not simply a way of
expressing the fact that it is very difficult
to answer the obvious question —
difficulty of choice is quite independent
of the presence of serious moral wrong
on both sides of the choice.
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morality yields an unacceptable picture,” she added.
Next, Professor Nussbaum asks us to consider
Antigone, Sophocles’s play. “Creon, the ruler, tells the
whole city that anyone who offers burial to
Polyneices, the traitor, is him/herself a traitor to the
city and will be put to death,” she began. “Antigone
cannot accept this edict because it asks her to violate
a fundamental, religious obligation - to seek burial for
her kin. As the philospher Hegel correctly aigued:
Each protagonist is too narrow, thinking of only one
sphere of value and neglecting the claim of the
other.” This means Creon thinks only of the city,
neglecting the “laws” of family and obligation, and
Antigone thinks only of the family and religion, not
recognizing the crisis in the city.
“Each one has an impoverished conception, not only
of moral value in general, but also of his or her
cherished sphere of value. The character Haemon
points out that Creon fails to recognize that these
citizens are also members of families,” she said. “A
protector of a city who neglects the values of family
and religion is hardly protecting a city at all.
Antigone, on her side, fails to note that families need
to live in cities in order to survive. A person who
thought weO about Antigone’s choice offers up
tragedy because both alternatives contain serious
wrong doings or problems.” Because neither Creon
nor Antigone see the tragedy inherent to the situation,
both of these people are what Nussbaum calls
“impoverished political actors.”
“This makes a huge difference for the political
future,” she explained. “The drama depicts an
extreme situation that is unlikely to occur very often.
In this extreme situation there may be no avoiding a
tragic clash of duties, but the character who faced the
tragic question squarely would be prompted to have a
group of highly useful thoughts about governments
in general. In particular, it is important to see that the
well being of the city and the unwritten laws of
religious obligation are of central ethical importance.”
Then this person could try to construct a city that
makes room for everything. “Eor people to freely
pursue their familial or religious obligations without
running afoul of city ordinances,” she added. “He or
she would want a city such as the Athenian leader
Pericles claimed to find in democratic Athens when
boasting about how the public policy in Athens shows
respect for unwritten laws of religion.”

In America, do we have what Pericles boasted about
in Athens? “We Americans believe that we can build
a public order that builds in spaces for people’s free
exercise of their religion,” said Professor Nussbaum.
“We believe individuals are not always going to be
tragically tom between civic ordinance and religious
command.”
“Ancient Athens has analogous anti-tragic thought as
a direct result, perhaps, of thinking of tragedies like
Sophocles and Antigone,” she said. “It was here,
indeed, that Hegel found plausibly the political
significance of tragedy. Paraphrasing, he said:
‘Tragedy reminds us of the deep importance of the
spheres of life that come into conflict within the
drama and of the dire results when they’re opposed,
and we have to choose between them. It therefore
motivates us to imagine what a world would be like
that did not offer people such a world that has
important action between two spheres of value. In
that sense, the end of the drama is written offstage
— by citizens who enact these insights in their own
constmcted political reflection,’ ” she said.
However, Professor Nussbaum did say “Hegel’s
approach to tragedy is a little too simple for it ignores
the possibility that some degree of tragedy may be a
stmctural feature of human life.” Human beings find
themselves with a wide and differing array of values
claiming attention and commitment. “The contingen
cies of life make it almost inevitable that some
disharmony will materialize among our many commit
ments,” she explained. “The only way out of this
disharmony would appear to lead a life so impover
ished in value that it neglects many things human
beings ought not to neglect.” A life like that will
avoid tragedy? “Actually, it doesn’t really avoid
tragedy — it just fails to see the tragedy involved in
its own neglect of genuine values,” she said. “Hegel
does give us the best strategy to follow, especially in
political life. But we really do not know if the
haimonious fostering of two, apparently opposed
values, can be achieved until we try to bring that
about.”

Many times, and in many places, there have been
people who believe that coming to an understanding
with religion and the state would be impossible.
“Athens, Rome, modem liberal states — grappling

J

with the even thornier problem of the plurality of
religions and of secular views - all, in their own ways,
try to prove these people wrong,” she said. “To a
great extent a political regime Hke ours (United States)
enables citizens to avoid ^nftgone-like tragedies. That
is what is meant by saying, as the Supreme Court said
until very recently, that the state may not impose a
substantial burden on an individual’s free exercise of
religion without what they call a compelling state
interest.”
But didn’t Creon have a compelling state interest’
“Won’t there be the chance that other people have
issues similar to Creon’s?” Perhaps, but Professor
Nussbaum does believe that we (in the U.S.) really do
our best to keep tragedy at bay. “People are not going
to be told that they can’t celebrate what their religion
requires them to celebrate because of some civic laws.
This is because we understand the course of the
tragic question. To ask an individual to depart from a
religious commitment is not just to impose an
inconvenience; it is to ask something that goes to the
heart of that person; it would deprive them of a
sphere of liberty to which, as citizens, they have
entitled to them, based on justice,” she explained.
She noted that Hegel’s idea of the tragic question
could be seen even in a “true modem story with
rather mundane content. In this story”, she explained,
“given that the harms done are smaller, it will look
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As well, we differ even more intensely about whether
impediments to the publication of pornography are im
possible burdens on the freedom of speech,” she said.
“But all would agree that there Is some such class of
morally central entitlements and that violating these is
different in kind, not just in degree, than depriving some
one of advantage or service. They agree that when
there is an apparent conflict between two public goals,
where one goal seems likely to be sacrificed the tragic
question must be asked.”

less tragic. But it still raises those similar Hegelian
questions.”
As a new, assistant professor. Professor Nussbaum
was dealing with the issue of working as well as being
the sole caretaker of her young daughter. During the
day posed no problem, because her daughter was in
day care. However, her colleagues would insist on
scheduling important and mandatory meetings in the
evening or late afternoon, during which she had to
pick up her daughter. She found herself facing her
own tragic question. “Often, neither of the alterna
tives looked fully, morally acceptable. Either I was
deserting my duty to my colleagues or my daughter.
The tragic question kept rearing its ugly head and
frequently its answer was, ‘no, there is no fully
acceptable course,” she remembered.
“This string of mini-tragedies was the result of
obtuseness,” she told the group.
“The anangements my colleagues made were neither
necessary nor sensible because it never dawned on
them to think that a person ought to be able to be
both a good primary parent and a good colleague,”
she said. “They never bothered to think what very
simple changes in schedule might be made to remove
the problem. Nobody could talk about this, nobody
could draw attention to it — certainly not the
women.”

5
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Then during one of these evening lectures a male,
tenured professor told the group he had to leave to
pick up his son. “This,” explained Nussbaum, “was
the first time there had been public acknowledgment
there was a tension between two spheres of value and
that we hadn’t been managing the tension very well.
Whether or not this professor noticed he was in the
middle of a tragic question remains to be seen. But
when he spoke about this situation, he drew attention
to the predicament of others who were more vulner
able and who had similar family obligations.”
In our society there is a tendency to look at things like
Professor Nussbaum’s now-resolved past string of
mini-tragedies and say, “That’s just the way life is.”
But is it?
“Whenever we are inclined to say this about any clash
of values, we should always pause and ask Hegel’s
question - is there a rearrangement of our practices
that can remove tragedy? In this case, it was easy.
However, in many others, it may not be,” she said.
Professor Nussbaum believes that examining child
care, family leave and re-examining the career track
would serve as useful starting points to finding the
answer. “We need to examine alternatives because
tragedy is rarely just tragedy. Most often behind the
gloom is stupidity, selfishness or laziness,” she added.
Naturally, however, there are times when pausing too
long over the tragic question is unnecessary. “For
example,” she said, “you needn’t pause too long if it is
obvious that at least one available course offers no
serious wrongdoing.” But it is useful to at least pose
the tragic question. “To do so just clarifies the danger
of our ethical alternatives, informing us about impor
tant differences between self-interest and commit
ment, and reinforces commitments to important moral
values that should be observed. It motivates us to
make appropriate reparations for conduct. The
recognition of tragedy leads us to ask how the tragic
situation might have been avoided by better central
planning,” she said. “And as such, all contemporary
liberal democratic societies ask the tragic question at
least implicitly.”
What this means is that these contemporary liberal
democratic societies look for certain particular social
goals and among those, pick out the ones that can
offer the best things to the greatest nurrftier of people.
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“These would be the things that everyone has a right
to demand. Sometimes the venue of such protected
areas value is relatively narrow, encompassing only
first generation rights (i.e. civil liberties), and some
times it is broader, taking in economic and social
rights,” she explained. “All nations have some
account, however lasting or disputed, of where the
threshold falls in respect to each of these entitle
ments. What kind of depravation of these rights is
somewhat acceptable as to constitute a violation of a
basic nonu? Usually we understand the importance
of the rights in moral terms, i.e., for these citizens to
lack these freedoms would be morally bad.”

j
9
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In regard to certain types of limits, most Americans
are very divided. “Some Americans think that certain
kinds of limits (freedom of the press, the right to
vote, etc.) are not just big costs to be bom, but costs
of a very particular kind,” she said. “High costs that
cause violation of rights which no citizen should
have to bear. We differ in many ways about where we
think that line falls between permissible, though
disadvantageous and morally serious depravations in
these areas, however.”
As an example, she spoke of Americans differing
opinions on the impediment currently faced by
Native Americans since they have been denied the
right to use peyote in their ceremonies. “Is or is this
not a violation of fundamental constitutional and
moral entitlement for these Native Americans? As
well, we differ even more intensely about whether

j

~

“There is a potential for trage
pushed beneath the threshol(
entitlements. Then the tragic
For wherever we find that citi;
beneath the threshold, social
People incur a particular costj
bear, the cost implicated in th
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In watching how public policy is made, it is interest
ing to see how frequently people find themselves
above or below what Nussbaum calls “the threshold”
of these entitlements. “Much further work must go
into specifying the threshold level in case of each
entitlement and traditions of judicial interpretation
will be involved in that process,” she noted. “There is
a potential for tragedy to arise when citizens are
pushed beneath the threshold on one of these basic
entitlements. Then the tragic question comes into
play. For wherever we find that citizens are being
pushed beneath the threshold, social justice has not
been done. People incur a particular cost no human
being ought to bear, the cost implicated in the idea of
human dignity itself.”
People are forced to chose between values involved in
family and values involved in employment constantly,
from asking people to work on Saturdays to manda
tory overtime. “How can we bring it about that
citizens don’t face tragic choices all of the time,”
asked Professor Nussbaum. “Notice that there is

Jy to arise when citizens are
I on one of these basic
question comes into play.
:ens are being pushed
justice has not been done,
no human being ought to
3 idea of human dignity itself.”

some connection between the obvious question and
the tragic question when citizens try to figure out
what an acceptable threshold level of central entitle
ment shall be,” she added. “Asking what options
actually are and figuring their costs and benefits
informs a process of reflection on the tragic question
as well, by telling us that some ways of rearranging
things are just impossible or much, much too costly.”
As another example, Professor Nussbaum posed a
hypotheical question: Suppose a religious group says
they want to remove all of their children from the
entirety of compulsory education telling us that
because of their religion, their children can not learn
to read and write? “Let’s suppose that we think the
alternative of allowing them to do this is very costly,
not only for their own children and the state’s interest
in their education, but also for other citizens who seek
similar exemptions possibly destroying the entire
system of education that’s the necessary basis for
intelligent citizenship in a pluralistic democracy,” she
ventured. “Now, we turn back to the tragic question.
Is this one of those instances where denying them
this alleged right is actually denying them a funda
mental entitlement involved in the very notion of free
exercise of religion? It seems clear that this isn’t one
of those cases. The answer to the question — are any
available courses morally acceptable? — is yes. It is
acceptable to make the children go to school up to a
certain point. We give people an acceptable level of
liberty of religion while insisting on some education.
We say this because we don’t think freedom of
religion in a pluralistic democracy can feasibly be
interpreted to demand something that will simply
erode the foundations of civic order. And in that
way, we draw a connection between our two ques
tions.”
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impediments to the publication of pornography are
impossible burdens on the freedom of speech,” she
said. “But all would agree that there is some such
class of morally central entitlements and that violating
these is different in kind, not just in degree, than
depriving someone of advantage or service. They
agree that when there is an apparent conflict between
two public goals, where one goal seems likely to be
sacrificed, the tragic question must be asked.”

However, she warns against taking this connection
too far. What if the administrators at her first
university concluded that changing the time of the
meetings would wreck the foundations of the social
order? “Unfortunately,” she said, “that is indeed how
people are inclined to view any ‘irritating’ changes in
their habits. As recently as 1873 the Supreme Court
held that to allow women to be lawyers in my home
state of Illinois would wreck the foundations of the
social order and go against what we call ‘the nature of
things.’ ” According to Professor Nussbaum, know
ing that we aren’t very reliable judges when it comes

7

to knowing what we need for the overall survival of
society, we should be skeptical when people tell us
that change will “erode society.”
She said, “we should not hold certain fundamental
entitlements hostage to current social mores.”
We should also be skeptical of the cries of those who
say the cost of securing these “certain fundamental
entitlements” to all citizens would be too high. “And
we should say to them, ‘let’s try first, and see how it
goes,’ “ she said. “After that, we should also be
prepared to recognize if some very important social
goods are not on/can not be on the list of entitle
ments - it should read next to these items: ‘Are not
available, or not available due to high costs in our
own current social environment.’ For this would give
us a motivation to design things better so we will be

able to secure the entitlement to people at some
future time.”

Martha Nussbaum received her B.A. from NYU and
her M.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard. She has taught at
Harvard, Brown, and Oxford Universities. Currently,
she teaches both philosophy and law at the University
of Chicago. Her publications \nc\ude Aristotle’sDe
MotuAnimaliumOSl^, TheFragility ofGoodness: Luck
andBhics in Greek TraggdyandPhUoscphyOSBS), Love’s
Knowiedg^OSFG), TheThettftyoflDesire(X9^,Poetic
Justice (1996), Forijove ofCountry (1996), Cultivating
LTumanity:AClassicalIDefenseofRrform inLiberal
EdiMMionOSBT),SexandSocialJi4sticeOS^, Women
arudJdurnanFTevdoprrierUQFPfS), IpheavalsoJJhought:
TkeInteUig^nceofEniotiomO!J)X).

Quotable Quotes
“The purpose of all war is peace.” - Saint Augustine

“Peace hath her victories, no less renowned than War.”
- John Milton

“Every gun that is made, every warship launched,
every rocket fired signifies, in the final sense, a theft
from those who hunger and are not fed, those who are cold
and not clothed.” - Dwight D. Eisenhower

by Robert P. La wry

Tragic Questions and Moral Vigilance
iis issue of the Center’s Newsletter features
more—give reparations, for example, when the
a lengthy report of a speech given nearly two
waging of even a just war devastates a country
years ago at CWRU by Martha Nussbaum,
and its largely innocent population.
Professor of Law and Philosophy at the University
of Chicago. Usually such a talk, even by someone as
The obvious question facing the United States
illustrious as Professor Nussbaum, is considered “old
government after 9-11 was how to respond to
news” after such a lapse of time. We do not con
the horrific terrorist attach launched by al Qaeda
sider it so. Here at the CPE, what is “news” is what
upon New York and Washington? The answer
contributes to the ongoing conversation about the
was: wage war against both that terrorist organi
moral life. Ms. Nussbaum’s talk surely is such a con
zation and the Afghan government that was pro
tribution. In it, she distinguishes between the “ob
tecting al Qaeda’s operations. The tragic ques
vious question” and the “tragic question,” the former
tion loomed within the answer to the obvious
being one forced upon us by the situation at hand;
question: how shall we aid the country that our
thus, requiring an answer in the form of a decision
bombs devastated? For aid we must. The Afghan
when events press upon us with immediacy. Lurk
war killed innocent people and wrecked havoc on
ing beneath the “obvious question,” however, and
an already poor country. We are morally respon
sometimes unseen by those in the fray, is the “tragic
sible to help to build a decent infrastmcture in
question.” That question is the one that forces the
Afghanistan; to stabilize its internal social and
actor to see that whichever way the “obvious ques
political mayhem; and to help it to become a free
tion” is answered, some harm is bound to be done,
and functioning nation.
some evil will directly flow from whatever decision
is made. The burden of the “tragic question” is not
Professor Nussbaum, however, has more to teach
erased by the answer given to the “obvious ques
us about “tragic questions” than that there is a
tion,” even if that answer is nuanced in a morally
moral imperative to clean up messes we helped
sensitive way. The tragedy in the hidden question
to make — even if those messes were necessary
means the actor must be willing to do something
in pursuit of a greater good. There is more to

T

“The tragic question loomed within the answer to the
obvious question: how shall we aid the country that
our bombs devastated? For aid we must....We are
morally responsible to help to build a decent
infrastructure in Afghanistan; to stabilize its internal
social and political mayhem; and to help it to become
a free and functioning nation.”
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understand in tragic situations than that cost-ben
efit analysis is an insufficient tool for moral analy
sis. Citing Hegel, Nussbaum asks us to ask our
selves continually: “is there a rearrangement of
our practices that can remove tragedy?” The an
swer is “no, not always,” for tragedy is part of the
human condition; but the answer is also, “yes, some
times.” When I teach professional responsibility
to law students, I challenge them to think that the
way they set up office practices or routinely talk to
clients can avoid tragic questions. Do you have a
sophisticated conflicts of interest procedure to
avoid problems before they arise? Do you make it
clear to clients that perjury is not something your
law office tolerates? Can these procedures and con
versations be themselves sensitivity established and

maintained so that stridency and personal offense
are eliminated’
Tragic questions can occur in the routine under
takings of life as much in the large affairs of state.
As Nussbaum says: “...tragedy is rarely just tragedy,
most often behind the gloom is stupidity, selfish
ness or laziness.” The tragic question often goes
unexamined as we deal with an obvious question.
Sometimes, however, the tragic question can be
avoided altogether. This takes moral vigilance,
something ethical training can sometimes provide.

Robert P. Lawry is the Director of the
Center for Professional Ethics and
a Professor of Law at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law.
His column, Director’s Corner,
appears in each issue.
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TOM ANDERSON APPOINTED
TO DEVELOPMENT POST
Ethics fellow Thomas W. Anderson has been
appointed interim vice president for development
and alumni relations at CWRU. Professor Anderson
teaches ethics regularly in the EDM program at the
Weatherhead School of Management and serves as a
development consultant through the national firm
Marts & Lundy.
Incidentally, Tom held this position once before,
earlier in his CWRU career. He was featured in this
newsletter in Volume 3, Number 1.

BETH MCGEE APPOINTED TO
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION POST
1996 CWRU Ethics Fellow Beth Mcgee was ap
pointed by Interim President James Wagner as
affirmative action officer for faculty. The mission
of the Office of Equal Opportunity and Diversity is
to provide support, guidance, and leadership in the
areas of equal opportunity, affirmative action, and
diversity; and to promote fair and equitable treat
ment in employment and other aspects of campus
life.
According to the CWRU’s Campus News, the creation
of the affirmative action officer position for faculty,
and moving this function out of the Office of the
Provost - were recommendations of the President's
Advisory Committee on Women.

Responsibilities in Higher Education: Experiential
Learning as a Model for Reform” appeared in The
Center for Professional Ethics Newsletter Volume 2,
Number 4. She gave her paper at the Sixth National
Communication Ethics Conference, Gull Lake,
Michigan May 12, 2000. (with thanks to CWRU’s
CampusNeui)
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BOB LAWRYAND MEDIA
In March and April of this year, Director Robert P.
Lawry was quoted in two major newspapers. The
first, “Calls for Lawyers to Blow the Whistle Ethics:
Enron’s Collapse Increases Pressure on the Legal
Profession to Allow Lawyers to Report Clients’
Financial Misdeeds” was published in the Los Angeles
Times-, and the second, “Lying for a Living When Jobs
Are Scarce, Double Talk is Common” ran in the Fort
Worth Star-Telegram. The first article focused on
lawyer-client relationships in the wake of the Enron
scandal while the second article mulled over the idea
of lying on the job, specifically when lying about
qualifications. You may view these articles in their
entirety on-line at each paper’s website.

DAVID MATTHIESEN AND
GIFTED PROGRAM
The gifted and talented students of Lakewood, Ohio
were treated to a program presented by ethics feUow
David Matthiesen. His program was part of a weeklong leadership camp this spring. Matthiesen is a
professor of materials science and engineering and
was a member of the space shuttle Columbia team in
the 1990s. (with thanks to the Cleveland Plain Dealer)

As readers may remember, most recently, an
excerpt of Professor Beth McGee’s paper “ Ethical
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